Afghanistan: Challenge or Formality?

THE MUSLIM WEEKLY 2004
As US engagement in Iraq continues to sap its energy and weaken its credibility, their fortunes in Afghanistan appear to be wildly different than a mere country (Iran) seperating them would suggest. Seemingly, the 37 country strong ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) with it's 9,500 troops and now with the PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) gradually making their presence felt in Mazare-Sharif and beyond, the US is left to concentrate it's muscle on the porous Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Meanwhile, the Locals appear content with the peace and prospective prosperity looming on their horizon.

The confirmation of Hamid Karzai as president just as as his principal backer George W. Bush.performs a not too dissimilar feat thousands of miles away could easily lead one to be reasonably optimistic of Afghanistan's future. Continuity breeding stability in a scenario where the focus may have changed somewhat from 'Flushing out remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaida' to extending ISAF's authority beyond Kabul, tackling the spiralling drugs issue and rebuilding a country shattered by over two decades of war.

In our short trip, opportunity beckoned for us to witness how the British, as effective stakeholders in Afghanistan's future were putting their skills and resources to use in benefitting the Afghan nation.

Undoubtedly, similarities do exist between Iraq and Afghanistan as far as the Muslim world is concerned. The US and its allies are deemed to be micro-managing their affairs, a little military tweak here, a political shuffle there and perhaps a social experiment elsewhere.

Nevertheless, the differences appear to vastly overshadow the similarities and this is where the vast historical experience of the British comes into its own. Living in Britain, one can quite easily understand and even empathise with the British emphasis on capturing the hearts and minds of the locals. A method of comparison could be illustrated in witnessing the difference between how the British conduct their mobile patrols (lightly armoured, open-jeeps, engaging with the community etc. compared to the Germans in their state-of-the-art tanks, armoured to the hilt as they whizz by from locality to locality).

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw recently discussed progress in Afghanistan, symbolised by 80% of the electorate turning out, but he re-iterated the need to disarm, demobilise and re-integrate militias (DDR) into mainstream society. He recognised that opium cultivation represented half the value of Afghanistan's non-drugs GDP , drug addiction wass growing and although he cites 7,000 addicts in Kabul, the Nejat centre (Drug Rehabilitation Centre) put the figure closer to 60,000. Nevertheless, he highlighted it as the greatest threat to the future of Afghanistan and considering 95% of the heroin in the UK originates from Afghanistan, the cause for concern is amplified.

In an encouraging move, the religious council of Afghanistan has issued a fatwa condemning narcotics.

On the funding front, $12.5 billion in international reconstruction aid has been pledged over the coming years (of which $3.5billion has already been disbursed) with G8 partners, The World Bank and The European Commission being fully engaged. Between 13 to 15,000 Afghan Police have been recruited and trained. Kabul is now certified as being free of heavy weapons while 80% is the nationwide figure given.

From the militia 20,000 had been re-integrated into regular army or civilian life.
The UK itself is committing 500 million pounds upto the year 2007 for reconstruction.
Outside Kabul, violence was thought to be sporadic with recent examples of engagement in Zabul and Kandahar, for which the Taleban appear to take responsibility. Other provinces thought to be particularly unsafe were Badakshan and Gardez. Which brings us appropriately to the subject of the Afghan National Army (ANA), predicted to be built up by 2009 according to the British Commander in Chief. He added that people wanted a national identity as opposed to being seen as Pashtuns, Tajiks or Uzbeks etc.

In relation to the elections, apart from the much reported indelible ink issue, there was some concern raised about there not being enough neutral observers to monitor the election process. While many approached the election with much gusto and eagerness, there were those that did not understand who or what they were voting for, some even thought the elections would automatically improve their lives. In light of improved security, ex-refugees had returned in droves from both Iran and Pakistan.

Germany, which was singled out in particular by the Imaam in Mazar-e-Sharif for the Bonn process, was not only involved with training the police force in Kabul but was also taking initiatives for providing employment viz. AGEF with help from Japan, the UNHCR and other NGO"S. 15,000 Afghanis are thought to have benefitted in Kabul so far.

On the subject of NGO's, they were involved in various projects ranging from building schools to engaging in health projects throughout the country. Some encountered problems in the form of violent attacks from locals at times, particularly in the past year. Other organisations like Christian Aid tended to be involved in developing conflict de-escalation strategies.

It is important to point out that there has also been a decrease in NGO staff as they're deemed to be competing with each other (globally, due to skills shortage). Interestingly, they described the elections as a spiritual upliftment.

Media in Afghanistan has clearly become more free in the past few years although locals do occassionally raise concerns about programmes such as the BBC production 'New Home New Life' pushing boundaies a bit too far and suspect an erosion of Afghan culture as a result.

Returning back to the DDR issue, we were fortunate enough to meet it's Director Peter Cruickshank , who quite concisely explained that regional power balances (The Warlord Phenomenon) had not changed by de-commissioning military units. He pointed out that 450 to 650 commanders needed to be dismantled while opining that a viable national army may take many years to create. Stressing that the DDR programme didn't resort to coercive methods to achieve their objectives, rather a voluntary one using incentives until the ANA was capable of imposing itself.

Re-emphasising his focus on de-factionalising and removing the power base of commanders, he gave examples of incentives ranging from medals given to those who disarm in ceremonies with President Karzai, clothing and food allowances, some given agricutural incentives, others access to micro-credit, even vocational traing and job placement (A huge demand for de-miners and teachers existed).
Meanwhile, some commanders were thought to get $5-600 per month while others were given the option of embarking on the Hajj.

"There was a problem with mass communication and getting the message across." lamented Mr. Cruickshank (A former British Military man himself).
Targets were very ambitious (i.e initial targets pointed to June 2005 as date for total disarmament)and an additional problem was deciding whether they were in a conflict or post-conflict situation, he reasoned.

Overall, the development of Afghanistan cannot be described as aformality and the challenges that lay ahead were immense. Nevertheless, there was certainly a distinctly positive strain emanating from the British Camp, the borrowed metaphor of the glass being 20% full rather than being 80% empty was an apt way of marching on.